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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the institutional and technical challenge posed by
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980. The 1980 Act per-
mitted the formation of interstate compacts for low-level waste disposal;
and after January 1, 1986, any compact state that hosts a regional
disposal facility may exclude wastes from non-member states.
Although Massachusetts is among the top 10 U.S. low-level waste generators,
there are no operating disposal sites in the Northeast. If the Common-
wealth began construction of a low-level waste disposal facility today,
it would not be operational by the 1986 deadline. In addition, shallow
land burial--the only licensed technology--has had a fifty per cent
practical failure rate and has never succeeded in an area with heavy
rainfall and a high water table.
Believing that this disposal technology is inappropriate for Massa-
chusetts, the author argues that the Commonwealth should oppose the
L.L.R.W.P.A. of 1980, seeking an extension on the 1986 deadline. In
addition, Massachusetts should put pressure on the federal government
to develop and test disposal technologies appropriate for areas with
heavy rainfall and high water tables. Massachusetts should also seek
Agreement State status and place low-level radioactive waste disposal
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Environmental Quality Engi-
neering. Finally, the state should develop interim storage capacity.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Lawrence S. Bacow
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INTRODUCTION
I.
The regulation of low-level radioactive waste is
important for two reasons:
1. A large percentage of the radioactive waste generated
in the United States is considered "low-level
radioactive waste."
2. The failure to safely and effectively regulate low-
level radioactive waste damages the public perception
of both radioactive hazard and the nuclear industry.
A. Low-level radioactive waste generation in the United
States
In the August 1981 issue of Nuclear News, George B.
Levin discussed the definition of "low-level radioactive
1
waste." According to the Low-level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act of 1980, P.L. 96-573, low-level radioactive waste is
"radioactive waste not classified as high level radioactive
waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct
material as defined in Section lle (2) of the Atomic Energy
Acts of 1954." Mine or mill tailings are not classified as
low-level radioactive waste. This definition permits
considerable discretion in classifying low-level radioactive
waste. Moreover, low-level waste is defined only by exclu-
sion--they are those wastes not considered in other
categories.
Low-level wastes are the routine wastes from nuclear
power plants; radioactive scintillation media and animal
tissue from hospitals and research institutions; and most
industrial radioactive wastes. While the category includes a
fairly wide range of materials, low-level radioactive waste
1
typically contains only a tiny fraction of radioactive
material.
In 1980, 90,928 cubic meters of low-level radioactive
waste were disposed at the three commercial LLW disposal sites
2
in the United States. About 50% of this waste was generated
by commercial power plants; 19% was produced by medical and
research institutions; 22% was produced by industrial
activities; and the remaining 9% was generated by U.S. Depart-
3
ment of Energy activities.
B. The Regulation of LLW in the United States
The successful regulation of LLW in the United States is
the critical problem facing the nuclear industry. Proponents
of nuclear power argue that a safe and effective LLW policy
would provide a foundation for a comprehensive nuclear waste
disposal program in the United States--invalidating a major
objection of opponents to nuclear power. Moreover, although
the problem is less technically challenging than safe disposal
of high level wastes--in fact, technically incompatible--
solving this problem would help re-build sagging public confi-
4
dence in the the nuclear industry. Finally, the regulation
of low-level radioactive waste is politically tractable. The
health risks posed by LLW, although uncertain, seem compara-
tively small; and the benefits of the uses of low-level
radioactive sources (cancer research, treatment, and detec-
tion, for example) are tangible and politically safe.
2
II.
Given the growing shortage of burial space for radioac-
tive material, low-level radioactive waste management has
become a critical policy question. After decades of
inactivity, the federal government has developed a wide array
of new policies within the last five years.
Faced with what they configure as a choice between
storing either high-level or low-level waste, the NRC has
5
begun de-regulating certain low-level radioactive wastes. In
addition to this semantic source reduction, the NRC has
supported a number of new waste treatments, using special eva-
porators and incinerators to decrease the volume of LLW
requiring burial.
Finally, in an attempt to relieve the geographical
imbalance between waste generation and disposal, NRC
activities are leading toward region formation and a series of
regulations that will permit the construction of new near-
surface radioactive waste burial sites. The Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 authorizes the creation
of interstate compacts; and as of January 1, 1986, any inter-
state compact state which provides a regional disposal
facility may restrict its use to member states.
All of these actions will have public health impacts; but
region formation poses the greatest problem for Massachusetts.
The Commonwealth must find a place to dispose of its LLW
before the 1986 deadline; and the regional commitment of the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 precludes a
3
convenient deal with any state that currently hosts an opera-
ting disposal facility.
This paper will examine the institutional and technical
challenge posed by the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
of 1980. Chapter 1 is a technical introduction to the nature
and health threat of radiation. Chapter 2 examines the
history of low-level radioactive waste management in the U.S.,
from the 1940's through the events that precipitated the
L.L.R.W.P.A. of 1980. Chapter 3 describes federal actions
since 1980; and Chapter 4 chronicles the Massachusetts
response to the 1980 Act. Chapter 5 is a brief overview of
Massachusetts waste generation. Chapter 6 describes the
existing regulatory framework; and Chapter 7 assesses the
effectiveness of this system. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes
the policy options currently available to Massachusetts.
The study will draw information from many sources, includ-
ing a broad range of government documents and technical
reports and interviews with regulatory officials.
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CHAPTER 1
The health hazards of radiation exposure are still
incompletely understood. However, the recognition of the
nature of radiotoxins is the basis of any social determination
of acceptable exposure levels and risk assessment.
Radioactivity:
All matter is composed of atoms. These atoms differ in
the number of neutrons and protrons in their nuclei. When
an atom has a ratio of protrons to neutrons that is outside of
an optimal range, the atom is unstable; the atom achieves
stability by ejecting radioactive emissions that carry away
excess energy. These emissions can be subatomic particles
(alpha particles composed of two neutrons and two protons or
beta particles composed of an electron and a massless neutri-
no) or pure energy (gamma or x-rays. X-rays are identical to
gamma rays in substance and effect; the only difference is
that x-rays are man-made while gamma rays occur naturally.).
Through these emissions, the radioactive atom eventually de-
cays into a stable, non-radioactive element.
Radioactivity is a property of matter. Unlike many other
chemical hazards, radioactive substances cannot be effectively
neutralized with current technology. Radioactivity does,
however, decay with time. The measure of this rate of decay
is radioactive half-life: the amount of time it takes for a
sample of radioactive material to lose half of its radioacti-
vity. Unfortunately, this does not imply that the sample
loses all of its radioactivity in two half-lives; during one
5
half life, half of any remaining radioactivity is lost.
The half-lives of radionuclides vary from a fraction of a
second to millions of years. Some of the most common radionu-
clides include tritium with a half-life of thirteen years,
Plutonium-239 with a half-life of 24,000 years, and Iodine-125
with a half life of 60.2 days.
There are three units used to measure radiation: curies,
rads, and rems. The curie is an expression of the quantity of
radiation in terms of the number of atoms that decay per
second. One curie is that quantity of radioactive material
that decays such that 37-billion atoms disintegrate per se-
cond. This is equivalent to the radioactivity in one gram of
pure radium.
In addition to this source-based definition, "rads" and
"rems" are used to measure the amount of radiation received by
an object. Rads measure the amount of energy absorbed from
ionizing radiation per gram of material, and rems (roentgen
equivalent man) measure the amount of damage to human tissue
from a dose of ionizing radiation. The rem measurement is
calculated by multiplying the radiation dosage in rads by a
factor, the RBE (relative biological effectiveness constant),
that adjusts for the biological damage caused by the
particular type of radiation. The RBE is based on gamma rays;
and alpha particles, with an RBE of 10, result in ten times as
much exposure as a gamma ray of equivalent energy.
As used colloquially, "radiation" refers to the ionizing
radiation emitted by x-ray machines and nuclear reactors.
6
Ionizing radiation knocks electrons out of atoms, creating
electrically charged ions. When present in living tissue,
these ions can interfere with normal biological functions:
combining with other chemicals to form abnormal chemical
complexes, destroying cell structures, and fragmenting DNA.
In general, ionizing radiation can have two effects: cell
destruction and mutation. If enough cells die, an organism
will die. Unless carefully targeted, large amounts of radia-
tion are usually required to kill this number of cells in an
adult human being. A single dose above 1000 rems is always
fatal, but below 200 rems, the survival rate is almost 100 per
cent. Small children and fetuses are considerably more
6
vulnerable.
Cell mutation can manifest itself in two ways. If repro-
ductive cells are damaged, mutations will be passed on to
offspring; and damaged somatic cells may develop into can-
cerous growths. In this context, it is important to note that
radiation effects may appear only years after exposure. Time
delays of 20 years are not uncommon, making diagnosis and
evaluation of radiation impacts particularly difficult.
As external hazards, different types of radiation have
varying abilities to penetrate tissues and damage cells.
Alpha particles are densely ionizing; but because of their
weight, they cannot penetrate skin. In contrast, gamma rays
can travel long distances and still maintain sufficient energy
to seriously damage cells. The penetration ability of beta
particles is between these two extremes.
7
In addition to their ability to damage tissue from an
external position, radioactive sources may be ingested or
inhaled. Radioactive particles lodged within the body will
continuously damage surrounding tissue for long periods of
time. Ironically, the superior penetration abilities of gamma
rays make it less destructive in this context; less damage is
inflicted--albeit to a greater volume of tissue.
Finally, radioactive isotopes are able to combine with
other elements, just as their non-radioactive isotopes can.
Because of this quality, the biochemical pathways for radioac-
tive isotopes within living tissue are complex and myriad.
Moreover, living organisms will tend to concentrate radioac-
tive isotopes far above their presence in the environment.
Man's position at the end of the food chain makes him
especially susceptible to this phenomenon. The chemical
similarity of calcium and Strontium-90, for example, has led
to the concentration of this isotope in human bones and milk.
The effects of low-level ionizing radiation are
disputed--even within the "apolitical" scientific community.
In 1979, Nobel Laureate Dr. Rosalyn S. Yalow argued that the
dangers of radiation have been exaggerated by the various
media:
It would be most unfortunate if laws, regulations, and
public policies for our country were determined by the
mass hysteria secondary to the fictions, fantasies, and
philosophies of the Fondas. It is time for cool heads
and the wisdom of proven facts to determine policy.7
Dr. Yalow, however, based this conclusion on an analysis of
8
the benefits and risks of the use of radioisotopes in medical
and research facilities. She prefaced her remark with the
disclaimer that "No one can state with certainty that there is
no risk."
The damage and diseases caused by radiation exposure are
8
identical to ailments caused by other factors. Radiation
burns are indistinguishable from burns caused by heat; and
radiation-induced cancer is identical to cancer not caused by
radioactivity. In addition, because of naturally present
background radiation, it is impossible to determine whether
any specific injury or cancer is caused by man-made radiation
(except in cases of massive radiation doses). We can esti-
mate, however, an aggregate number of additional cancers that
will be produced by an increase in radiation exposure. There-
fore, we can examine the effects of low-level radiation expo-
sure--but only statistically.
The disagreement within the scientific community centers
on the difficulty of extrapolating the effects of low-level
exposure from the study of the few cases when populations were
9
exposed to massive doses of radiation victims of the
bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, American soldiers exposed
during atomic bomb tests, and British workers who ingested
large quantities of radium while painting luminous watch
faces, for example.
Two basic hypotheses are proposed to evaluate the effects
of low-doses of radiation. The linear model assumes that the
radiation dose and incidence of radiation-induced cancer are
9
directly proportional; while the linear-quadratic model as-
sumes that the risk of cancer decreases at a greater than
linear rate as dosage falls. In the 1980 National Academy of
Sciences Report on the Biological Effects of Ionizing Radia-
tion, the linear-quadratic model was adopted for excess cancer
risk, while the linear model was used to estimate genetic
10
effects. The N.A.S. report did acknowledge that significant
uncertainty did exist in the predictions of low-dose ef-
11
fects. Recent studies of Nagasaki survivors strongly sup-
port the linear model and its higher estimates for cancer
12
risk.
(It is important to note that the controversy has focused
on cancer risk; and there has been little public conflict over
possible genetic damage--despite the potentially greater im-
pacts. Cancer is the most feared disease in our society,
polarizing any discussion; while the lack of human "monstrosi-
ties"--explicit physical evidence of damaging mutation--has
decreased concern over potential long-term genetic effects.)
The resolution of the modelling conflict, however, would
not solve the basic need to socially evaluate radiation expo-
sure risks. While a finding of "no-risk" would give radioac-
tivity a clear field, the current debate centers on issues of
risk level. Moreover, studies indicate that cumulative radia-
tion dosage is the significant measure--not single doses--and
that there is no threshhold or safe level for radiation expo-
13
sure. The fact that only statistical assessments are pos-
10
sible tends to depersonalize the health risks; but it also
makes the economic evaluations painfully explicit. Any deci-
sion on an acceptable level must explicitly address the issue
of the value of a human life.
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Types of Radioactive Waste:
The current system for classifying nuclear wastes uses
several criteria to distinguish between categories: concentra-
tion of radioactive material, the source of the waste, and the
presence of certain radioisotopes. Although only four have
practical meaning, five broad waste categories exist: high-
level waste, spent fuel, transuranic waste uranium mine and
mill tailings, and low-level waste.
High level wastes are officially defined as the waste
streams that result from the reprocessing of spent reactor
fuel. In April, 1977, however, President Carter, recognizing
the political and technological hazards of routine plutonium
production and transport--especially the possibility of
nuclear theft--indefinitely deferred commercial reprocessing
14
of spent fuel and the recycling of plutonium. As a result
of this decision, spent fuel has come to be considered high-
level waste. High-level wastes are generally liquids with
high-intensity, penetrating radioactivity. These liquids
usually contain hundreds to thousands of curies per gallon; if
solidified into sludge, saltcake, or calcine, the concentra-
tion of radioactivity is much higher. High level waste also
generates appreciable heat and must be handled remotely. By
1980, approximately 2,550 cubic meters of high-level waste
15
were being generated annually.
Transuranium-contaminated wastes are wastes containing
more that 10 nano-curies of transuranic nuclides per gram of
material. These wastes are produced by the bombardment of
12
uranium and uranium products within reactors during spent fuel
reprocessing and the fabrication of plutonium (for weapons
production). Although far less intensely radioactive than
high-level waste, many transuranic wastes have lifetimes of
thousands of years or longer. Plutonium-239, for example, has
a half-life of 24,000 years. The federal government antici-
pates the generation of approximately 529 cubic meters of
16
transuranic waste annually through the year 2000.
Uranium mine and mill tailings are produced through the
excavation and processing of uranium ore. Although these
tailings contain only naturally occurring radioactive
materials, they are generated in huge volumes and have long
half-lives. Moreover, mine tailings entered the public
consciousness when it was discovered that they were being used
to make cement for home and school foundations in Colorado,
Wyoming, and Utah. Over four million cubic meters of tailings
17
are generated annually.
Low-level waste is defined as any waste that does not fit
into any of the preceding categories. The only numerical
standard is a limit of 10 nanocuries of transuranic elements
per gram--the dividing line between classification as low-
level or transuranic waste. Low-level wastes include rinsing
and decontamination fluids, protective clothing, and
radioactive fluids and carcasses from medical and biological
tests. In the past, much material discarded as low-level
waste was simply suspected of being radioactive. As disposal
prices have risen, however, this practice has been dying out.
13
Unlike the waste in other categories, low-level waste is
generated in almost all activities involving radioactive
materials. Generators include nuclear power plants;
universities, laboratories, and hospitals; general industrial
and nuclear fabrication plants; and the federal government.
Low-level wastes generally average less than one curie of
activity per cubic foot of material, but there is wide varia-
tion in radiotoxicity. Moreover, waste values are huge--
approximately 90,000 cubic meters of commercial low-level
18
waste and 45,000 cubic meters of defense waste annually.
Of the various radioactive waste categories, low-level
waste does not necessarily pose the most critical public
health threat. However, low-level radioactive waste volumes
are huge; and the activities that generate low-level waste are
distributed throughout the country. Moreover, most low-level
wastes are generated by civilian activities; and de-regulation
of the substances would not threaten national security.
Finally, disposal of low-level waste is private and commer-
cial. These institutional characteristics have made low-level
waste the center of the current debate.
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CHAPTER 2
The History of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Regulation in the
United States, 1940's through 1980:
Significant low-level radioactive waste generation began
in the United States during the development of the Atomic Bomb
in the 1940's. The biological effects of ionizing radiation
were poorly understood during this period; and the frantic
push toward development of the Bomb left little room for
criticisms of disposal technology. These factors, combined
with the intense secrecy surrounding the Manhattan Project,
left disposal exclusively in the hands of generators--
scientists consumed by their single-minded pursuit of dis-
coveries, and administrators and support staff almost com-
pletely ignorant of potential hazard. As a result, many low-
level radioactive waste disposal sites associated with the
19
Manhattan Project are no longer known ; and the federal
government has asked for assistance in locating Manhattan
20
Project disposal sites. In 1975, a cache of plutonium
contaminated garbage was found in a parking lot of a Los
21
Alamos, New Mexico motel.
At the end of WW II, with the passage of the Atomic
Energy Acts and the establishment of a tradition of (nominal)
civilian control of nuclear technology, federal policy pro-
moted the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy.
President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program supported and
subsidized the development of atomic power plant technology,
and the spread of radioisotope use in biological research and
15
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medical treatment. The medical uses of radioactive isotopes
began in 1936 when John Lawrence and the Berkeley Group
administered Phosphorus-32 to a patient suffering from leuke-
23 24
mia. X-rays had been used therapeutically since 1896.
The Atomic Age, however, brought new prestige to nuclear
medicine and made radioisotopes, distributed by the Atomic
Energy Commission, easily available to U.S. scientists.
(The Atomic Energy Commission, provided with a blank
check by Congress and in general political favor, also
encouraged the development of what H. Peter Metzger called
"atomic gadgets" intended to capture the public imagination,
much as the atomic bomb had. In the post-War period, atomic
energy was a "solution in search of a problem", and well-
funded projects investigated the use of atomic propulsion
systems for aircraft (flying reactors which spit-out atomic
25
trash in their exhaust), missile systems, and submarines.)
The post-War period also saw the initiation of the first
26
detailed research into the biological effects of radiation.
During wartime, biomedical research was considered a necessary
but definitely ancillary activity. Biological research was
limited to the level necessary to protect personnel health and
safety. The "Atoms for Peace" program implied large waste
volumes and the wide disseminiation of radionuclides; and it
became clear that insufficient biological data was available
27
to design programs to protect workers and the public.
From the perspective of national defense, other more
important regulatory problems accompanied the diffusion of
16
this new technology outside of defense sectors; and a strict
tracking system was developed to control the distribution of
radioactive materials--even the radioisotopes intended only
28
for medical use and freely distributed before the war.
Although developed primarily as a measure to prevent nuclear
proliferation, a side-effect was to establish a tradition of
careful monitoring of radioactive substance use and genera-
tion--rationalized and largely self-policed by the then
incontrovertible demands of national security. This, combined
with the fact that the production of radioactive source
materials requires a large and visible superstructure--a
reactor, cyclotron or mining operation--provided a strong
regulatory base from which waste management could draw.
In addition to its role in promoting civilian uses of
nuclear energy, the AEC was exclusively responsible for the
29
disposal of radioactive waste. However, despite the careful
regulation of radioactive materials and a growing recognition
of health dangers, the Atomic Energy Commission paid little
attention to the disposal of radioactive wastes. In its
publication A Nuclear Waste Primer, the League of Women Voters
noted that while the federal government spent billions to
produce nuclear weapons and commercialize nuclear power during
the 1950's and 60's, it spent only $300 million on research
30
into disposal techniques. Senator Frank Church of Idaho
estimated that the AEC spent less than one tenth of one per-
cent of its budget on the development or analysis of waste
31
technology.
17
Recognizing the federal government's predilection for
convenient, inexpensive, short-term solutions, the League of
32
Women Voters characterized U.S. policy as "benign neglect."
While little damage has been done by past failures (beyond the
loss of public confidence in the government), the term
"benign" seems unnecessarily charitable. In his book The
Atomic Establishment, H. Peter Metzger chronicled the hostile
and uncooperative attitudes of AEC officials toward sugges-
tions for more effective disposal and accusations of past
failures. The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the AEC's
congressional watchdogs, were no better. Criticisms from the
National Academy of Sciences, state agencies, and the EPA were
33
routinely ridiculed or ignored.
A basic unwillingness to admit past errors was compounded
because the prestige of atomic energy--protected by technical
complexity, national security dogma, and national pride in
American science and technology--gave the A.E.C. and the Joint
Committee the power to ignore criticisms.
More fundamentally, in the Union of Concerned Scientists'
Radioactive Waste, Ronnie D. Lipshutz pointed out the basic
contradictions and predictable failures of an agency charged
34
with both the promotion and the regulation of atomic energy.
While the suggestion that the federal government should 'only
regulate--not promote' technology is extreme and ahistorical,
the AEC's conflicting imperatives ensured that safety issues
were ignored. The AEC is not the only group to blame. Scien-
tists and administrators interested in promoting a new techno-
18
logy will always minimize potential hazards; the AEC was
dangerous only because there was no agency or group to check
their excesses.
During the 1940's and 1950's, the federal government was
responsible for all radioactive waste. Low-level waste was
buried in shallow pits or packed in steel drums and dumped at
sea. Between 1946 and 1959, thousands of containers of low-
level waste were discarded at ocean waste dumps off the Faral-
lon Islands near San Francisco, off the Delaware coast, and in
Boston harbor. The U.S. stopped issuing ocean dumping permits
in 1960, and the last legal ocean dump was made in 1970.
Current studies estimate that approximately 25% of these drums
are leaking. Although they probably pose no pubic health
threat, they illustrate a history of federal deferral and
35
haphazard planning in radioactive waste management.
In 1959, the Atomic Energy Acts of 1954 were amended to
allow states to assume control of certain AEC licensing and
regulatory functions. According to the amendment, the program
was enacted to "recognize the states' interest in atomic
energy activities, to clarify the respective responsibilities
of the states.. .and to provide a statutory means by which the
AEC could relinquish to the states (a) part of its regulatory
36
authority..." Under the Agreement State Program, the states
had no authority over nuclear reactors, defense generated
wastes, exports and imports, and quantities of fissionable
material large enough to sustain chain reaction. The 1959
amendment, however, did give states authority over byproduct
19
material (radioisotopes), source material, and small quanti-
ties of special nuclear material. All states were already
responsible for the regulation of x-rays; naturally occuring
radioactive materials, such as radium; and accelerator-pro-
duced radioactive material. In the event of mismanagement by
the state and a threat to public health and safety, the AEC
could terminate its agreement with the state. By 1980, 26
states had entered into the Agreement State program.
In 1962, as part of its commercialization policy, the AEC
licensed the first non-federally controlled burial facilities
36a
for commercial, low-level radioactive waste. These
privately-run disposal sites in Beatty, Nevada, and Maxey
Flats, Kentucky, were followed by West Valley, New York in
1963; Hanford, Washington in 1965; Sheffield, Illinois in
1967; and Barnwell, South Carolina in 1971. Various reasons
were given for each state's willingness to host a radioactive
waste disposal site. Kentucky hoped to attract nuclear
industry, for example; and Washington, Nevada, and South
Carolina already hosted large government nuclear research and
37
disposal facilities.
This collection of disposal sites provided a reasonable
regional distribution, but the disposal technology used left
much to be desired. In general, shallow land burial involved
packing the waste in steel drums and cardboard boxes, dumping
38
these containers into a trench, and covering them with dirt.
It was generally accepted that the containers would rapidly
lose their integrity--often within a few years. Impermea-
20
bility and "ionic retention properties" of the soil were
38a
expected to prevent underground radionuclide migration.
Problems began in 1972 when state and EPA investigators dis-
covered that radiation had migrated off the Maxey Flats,
Kentucky site. Although only small amounts had been detected
off-site, previous assumptions of trench containment were
shaken. In 1976, the state added a 10 cent surtax on each
pound of waste disposed at Maxey Flats, effectively pricing
39
the site out of the market. Maxey Flats closed in 1977.
In 1975, seepage was discovered at some trenches of the
West Valley disposal facility. Ironically, the silty, imper-
meable soil for which the site had been chosen was the cause
of the detected seepage. The trenches acted as bathtubs,
filling with rainwater and eventually over-flowing. The
facility is now closed, and the trenches are routinely pumped.
This pumping will be required indefinitely, and the perpetual
40
care fund is woefully inadequate to cover this expense.
In 1978, Sheffield closed when the last licensed trench
was filled and state residents refused to permit expansion of
the facility. The U.S. Geological Survey noted that the
discovery of a previously unknown layer of sand on the site
41
may have prompted the refusal.
The detection of radioactive leaks and the disposal site
closings were facilitated by the AEC's loss of exclusive
control over the disposal process during the 1970's. Under
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975, the De-
partment of Transportation adopted packaging and transport
21
regulations for radioactive materials. Later, routing regula-
42
tions were added to this list of DOT controls. In addition,
the EPA, established by President Nixon under a government
reorganization plan, was granted broad responsibilities for
establishing general environmental standards--including radia-
43
tion exposure levels.
Most important, in 1974, in the face of criticisms that
the AEC had dealt inadequately with waste disposal and that
the Commission had subverted the traditional system of
governmental checks and balances, the AEC was superseded by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. AEC regulatory authority
was transfered to this new organization, while the Department
of Energy (then the Energy Resource and Development Agency)
was charged with the promotion and development of nuclear
power.
By 1979, only three of the six existing commercial dis-
posal sites were accepting waste. Transport costs soared for
Northeast and Midwest generators forced to ship their wastes
to the remaining sites in Hanford, Washington; Beatty, Nevada;
and Barnwell, South Carolina. More important, political pres-
sure against dumping and increasing resident discontent deve-
loped in the states still accepting waste.
South Carolina governor, Richard Riley, campaigned with
the promise of reforms in South Carolina's radioactive waste
44
policies. Washington voters became increasingly vocal in
their criticisms of the existing national waste disposal si-
tuation. In 1980, Washington's Governor Ray opposed a state
22
referendum to ban wastes from out-of-state generators. In a
campaign where nuclear waste figured largely, Ray lost the
election. The referendum passed, but was later declared
44a
unconstitutional.
This political climate created a radioactive waste
"states'-rights movement," initiated in 1979 by South
45
Carolina's Richard Riley. In May of 1979, Riley turned away
two truck tankers full of the first wastes from the Three-Mile
Island clean-up. This was an unprecedented (and possibly
unconstitutional) move, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
did not confront Riley. It was later discovered that these
wastes violated the standards of the Barnwell, S.C. disposal
site license. Next, Riley revised Barnwell's license,
extending an existing ban on liquid wastes to include even
liquids that had been solidified in an absorbing material.
This action effectively excluded all medical and biological
research wastes.
In July, 1979, Riley met with Governor Ray of Washington
state and Governor List of Nevada. They agreed to "mutually
ban any violator of laws, rules or regulations concerning the
packaging and/or transporting of low-level nuclear wastes"; to
collectively ask for better enforcement by the NRC and the
Department of Transportation; and to press for reforms in
46
national low-level radioactive waste policies.
In the fall of 1979, Governor Riley announced that the
license of the Barnwell site was to be revised again--this
time to decrease the waste volume accepted at the site by 50
23
per cent over the next two years. This volume reduction,
accompanied by a price increase that would maintain Chem-
Nuclear's (the private firm that operated the Barnwell
facility) profits, was an effective statement of Riley's
intention to make Barnwell a regional disposal site instead of
"the path of least resistance" for the nation. Despite the
questionable constitutionality of this revision, the NRC did
not challenge Governor Riley. Recognizing the political
delicacy of their position in South Carolina (and recognizing
the price increase), Chem-Nuclear did not protest Riley's
47
action.
This situation was compounded by the simultaneous
closings of both Beatty and Hanford because of packaging
violations and the detection of radiation leaks. In his book
Radwaste, Fred Shapiro noted that violations of the magnitude
justifying closure were not unusual and previously had been
48
ignored ; but the decision to close the disposal sites was
legally valid. While their collective decision violated a
tacit agreement that sloppiness in radwaste disposal should be
ignored, it reflected changing public attitudes toward
radioactivity and toxic wastes in post Three-Mile Island/Love
Canal America.
The resulting situation left medical and biological waste
with no disposal sites in the U.S. As barrels of radioactive
hazard accumulated in hospitals and labs, legislators were
bombarded with letters and pleas from prestigious universities
and hospitals. By November 1979, these pleas were given a new
24
urgency when hospitals threatened to discontinue all nuclear
49
services by the end of the year.
By singling out medical waste--by accident or design--the
three governors had gained a powerful and very prestigious
ally: the medical profession. The wastes generated by
biological research and medical applications tend to be less
harmful than other low-level radioactive waste (with the
notable exception of radioactive Iodine, a well known carcino-
gen that collects in the thyroid). Moreover, the benefits of
the use of radioisotopes in medicine are clear and dramatic.
Few people would suggest that the problem of medical waste
generation should be solved by discontinuing nuclear services.
In addition, by emphasizing the medical applications of
radioactivity, the crisis altered the public perception of
what "nuclear waste" was all about.
Finally, the tone of pleas from medical representatives
did not condemn the three governors. Instead, they advocated
the development of a comprehensive waste policy for the U.S.
50
and/or the de-regulation of the bulk of medical wastes.
By the end of 1979, the low-level radioactive waste
crisis was resolved by the warning that a continued resistance
by the three governors would result in federal intervention.
According to Fred Shapiro:
The NRC let it be known that it had called on the DOE to
prepare a contingency plan for opening some of its low-
level sites for commercial waste. Not entirely by coin-
cidence, the three DOE sites selected were Hanford, the
Nevada Test Site and the Savannah River Plant, which just
happen to adjoin, or in the case of Hanford, contain, the
three commercial sites at issue.51
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Despite this apparent defeat, the three governors did succeed
in restructuring the debate on low-level waste management in
the U.S. As late as 1978, low-level radioactive waste manage-
ment was assumed to be a federal responsibility--by defini-
tion. In 1978, the Department of Energy Task Force for Review
of Nuclear Waste Management recommended that the federal
government take control of all low-level waste mangement and
disposal, "acquiring ownership and control" of all existing
52
disposal sites." In another 1979 study, the President's
Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management concurred
with this plan, urging a regional distribution of disposal
53
facilities. The IRG also recommended the formation of the
State Planning Commission on Radioactive Waste Management.
After 1979, however, states' rights figured prominently in the
recommendations of every major policy study. In the 1979
hearings before the Committee on Science and Technology, Dr.
Joseph Hendrie, chairman of the NRC, noted that his strategy
for low-level waste disposal had undergone a radical transfor-
mation:
"There was a while a year or two ago, perhaps before,
when I think I would have told you that I thought the
Federal Government should step in and take over the low-
level waste disposal responsibilities across the country.
I have changed my mind on it. It seems to me the States
could do a perfectly good job. The responsibility lies
out there; the stuff generated widely in all the
States."55
This was not a minor change. The idea of "state responsibi-
lity for the waste it generates" was new--especially at high
levels of the NRC. It is difficult to pinpoint the motivation
for Dr. Hendrie's change of heart, although a later remark
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suggests frustration with growing state and citizen criticism
of NRC policies:
"I think it would do them (the States) a lot of good out
there to deal with these wastes and understand that it
isn't the end of the world, and that there are very
reasonable things that can be done rather simply with
this material to protect it. I think it would be a very
useful way of dealing with it."56
While the artificially generated "Crisis of 1979" did
bring national attention to the low-level radioactive waste
problem, the federal government was powerful enough to deal
with any complaints or complainers. The post-1979 shift may
simply reflect the ongoing history of federal deferral in
waste management (or the recognition that the NRC, which did
57
not even mann a 24-hour crisis hotline in 1980 , was singu-
larly unequipped to undertake the administrative challenge of
effective low-level radioactive waste disposal.
In a February 12, 1980 message to Congress, President
Carter directed the Department of Energy "to work jointly with
states, other government agencies, industry and other organi-
zations, and the public, in developing national plans to
establish regional disposal sites for commerical low-level
58
waste."
In August of 1980, The National Low-Level Waste Manage-
ment Program, through its prime contractor EG&G Idaho, Inc.,
published a strategic planning documnet entitled Managing Low-
Level Radioactive Wastes: A Proposed Approach. A task force
representing industry (generators and site operators), federal
and state officials, academics, and private consultants was
27
formed to help develop the strategy.
The study anticipated a crisis in low-level waste manage-
ment by the mid-1980's, when waste generation would exceed
59
existing disposal capacity. The strategy recommendations
were based on several premises, including the assumptions that
safe disposal is technically feasible and that disposal faci-
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lities must be regionally distributed.
Task force recommendations centered on the development of
a waste classification system based on total hazard (both
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chemical and radioactive) . Different wastes classes would
require different disposal technologies; and environmental
release would be recommended as a safe disposal option for
62
wastes that "pose no significant hazard to the public." The
task force also supported the use of volume reduction tech-
63
niques and interim storage.
Institutionally, the report recommended that state and
federal governments divide responsibility for low-level waste
64
disposal. States would be responsible for the bulk of the
waste, while the federal government would dispose of the most
radioactive material classified as "low-level". According to
the report, "High-level waste repositories have been desig-
65
nated a Federal responsibility." Ironically, when this
document was published, low-level waste disposal was also a
"Federal responsibility."
The report supported the use of incentives to facilitate
the siting process; and while regional compacts were consi-
dered, no mention of excluding wastes from non-compact states
28
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was made.
During 1980, the Congress attempted to develop and pass a
comprehensive waste policy act. Unable to agree on policies
for high-level waste disposal, Congress finally passed a bill
on December 13, 1980, that asserted that states are respon-
sible for disposing of commercial low-level wastes generated
67
within their borders. The bill, the Low-Level Waste Policy
Act of 1980, permits states to form regional compacts for the
disposal of commercial waste and authorizes the exclusion of
waste from non-member states after January 1, 1986. Finally,
the Act ordered the preparation of a report by the Department
of Energy. The DOE report, written to assist the States,
would define anticipated disposal capacity needs; evaluate
existing commercial sites; compare the transportation require-
ments of a regional system to present practices; and evaluate
the capacity of DOE facilities to provide interim storage for
commercially generated waste.
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CHAPTER 3
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980
theoretically transformed the balance of federal and state
power in low-level radioactive waste mangement. After years
with exclusive authority, federal regulators found themselves
with a new role: providing advice and technical assistance to
the states as they each struggled to develop low-level
radioactive waste management plans. The events of the
following years, however, showed that the NRC was unable to
function effectively in this new capacity.
Federal Involvement in Low-Level Waste Management after
The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980:
Federal involvement in low-level radioactive waste
management did not end with the the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act of 1980. With the passage of the Act, the
NRC relinquished responsibility for low-level radioactive
waste disposal, but lost very little of its regulatory
authority. Even under the Agreement State Program--the posi-
tion that maximizes a state's regulatory authority--state
regulations must be compatible with NRC rules. As set out by
the NRC, "compatability" implies:
1. States must have regulations essentially identical to
10 CFR Part 19, Part 20 (radiation dose standards and
effluent limits) and those required by UMTRCA, as
implemented by Part 40.
2. States should adopt other regulations to maintain a
"high degree of uniformity with NRC regulations."67
While this situation permits some freedom to tailor rules to
local needs, the NRC regulations effectively limit the range
of possible strategies that a state may employ. A complete
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demand-based system for radioactive waste disposal (in which
the only policy action is creation of incentives for safe
disposal), for example, would be unthinkable in this context
where precise environmental standards must be met and records
must be kept.
Although most states feel that the Agreement State
Program is successful, in a 1982 National Governors' Council
report, many added that "the necessity of meeting NRC review
criteria sometimes directs state resources towards those areas
in which they will be judged by NRC and away from what states
67a
consider more pressing problems."
In early 1981, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission de-
regulated certain concentrations of tritium and Carbon-14.
According to the current regulations, Title 10, Chapter 1,
20.306:
Any licensee may dispose of the following licensed
material without regard to its radioactivity:
(a) 0.05 microcuries or less of hydrogen-3 or carbon-
14, per gram of medium, used for liquid scintillation
counting; and
(b) 0.05 microcuries or less of hydrogen-3 or carbon-
14, per gram of animal tissue averaged over the weight of
the entire animal....68
The scintillation fluid and contaminated animal carcasses de-
regulated by this change accounted for 43 and 9 percent,
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respectively, of all institutional wastes (by volume).
Amy Goldsmith of the Massachusetts Nuclear Referendum
Committee argues that any increase in radioactive emissions
into the atmosphere or sanitary sewer system should be op-
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posed. Similarly, in the Spring 1982 issue of Business and
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Society Review, Lorna Salzman attacked the NRC de-classifica-
tion program, accusing the government and industry of ignoring
public health in an effort to minimize disposal costs. In a
particularly dramatic metaphor, she compared the effects of
this de-classification program to placing a frog in cold water
71
and slowly raising the temperature, boiling it to death.
Doctors testifying in the 1979 Committee on Science and
Technology hearings on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Burial,
however, emphasized the relative harmlessness of the radioac-
tive material used in biological research. Nobel laureate Dr.
Rosalyn Yalow testified:
We must make distinctions among bombs and fallout,
nuclear reactors and disposal of their wastes, and the
safe handling and waste problems associated with the
medical uses of radioisotopes. It is only the last which
I will consider today....The problem of radioactive waste
disposal from hospitals and medical centers is not a
problem. To quote a very distinguished former President,
"all we really have to fear is fear itself."72
Dr. Yalow went on to note that the quantity of Carbon-14
naturally present in the "non-radioactive" garbage produced by
the VA Hospital where she worked was comparable to the amount
of that radioisotope present in the radioactive waste produced
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by the hospital nuclear services. She also commented that
0.1 microcuries of Carbon-14 are naturally present in any
74
living human being. It should be noted that the concentra-
tions of Carbon-14 in living human tissue and the now de-
regulated substances differ by four or five orders of
magnitude.
Despite the predilection for anecdote on both sides of
the debate, it is important to recognize that the
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Massachusetts medical and institutional community shipped less
than 20 curies annually of radioactive animal carcasses and
liquid scintillation fluid in the two years before the de-
75
classification program began. Massachusetts generators
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shipped a little over 20 curies in 1979. Given that the de-
classified material is the least radioactive waste this popu-
lation generates, an estimate of 8 additional curies of
environmental release seems generous. While this is not
insignificant, it pales next to the hundreds of thousands of
curies shipped by industrial users. Moreover, since radioac-
tive Hydrogen and Carbon behave just as their non-radioactive
isotopes, no excessive concentration of these radioactive
elements should appear in human organs. While the most recent
de-classifications may pose no immediate health hazard, many
environmentalists oppose what they perceive as the NRC's
77
decision to de-classify for convenience.
There is general agreement within the medical community
that the chemical hazard posed by scintillation fluid is more
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significant than its radiological toxicity. Moreover,
studies have shown that when organic solvents are buried with
radioactive hazard, the two may interact in burial trenches to
form an ionically neutral compound. This compound will not be
contained by the ionic retention properties of soil, and rapid
79
subsurface migration will occur.
It is important to note, however, that the decision to
de-classify the radioactive component of scintillation fluid
places this liquid under the jurisdiction of the hazardous
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waste management system. Moreover, the standard disposal
technique for organic solvents is incineration. Standard
incineration techniques will release much of the radioactivity
into the atmosphere, and any residue will probably have a much
higher radioactive concentration than the original liquid.
During the comment period for the proposed de-classifi-
cation, a group of sanitation workers expressed concern that
they might face an increased occupational hazard from the
80
radioactive wastes discharged into the sewer system.
However, no inquiry was made regarding workers in the
hazardous waste system--where concentration of the
radioactivity in the wastes is much more likely. No detailed
information is available on the effects of the de-regulation
on the handlers of hazardous waste.
Ironically, the de-classification of the medical and
biological wastes and the system of incentives it creates
could produce a viscious circle that would defeat the purpose
of the regulatory system. In order to meet minimum concentra-
tions, labs could dilute radioactive hazard in sufficient
organic solvent (or water) to lower concentrations to unregu-
lated levels. The total radioactivity of the material, is
exactly the same, however; and if volume reduction techno-
logies are used by the hazardous waste system, the result will
be gas or solid releases that contain all of that radioacti-
vity--potentially at higher concentrations than the waste
collected.
The NRC regulations specify that an (unenforceable) maxi-
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mum of five curies each of Carbon-14 and Hydrogen-3 may be
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flushed into sanitary sewers ; but there are no limits on the
total amount of radioactivity shunted into the hazardous waste
management system as a result of the de-classification
program.
There is no ongoing NRC study to investigate the impacts
of the interaction of the solvents and radioactivity in the
hazardous waste stream.
The NRC program to establish de-minimus levels was ap-
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proved by the U.S. Task Force on Radioactive Waste in 1980 ;
and the National Low-Level Waste Management Program supported
82a
the development of de-minimus levels. De-classification of
certain concentrations of Technicium-99 and Sulphur-35 cur-
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rently is under consideration.
In June, 1981, the National Low-Level Waste Management
Program, EG&G Idaho, Inc., published Managing Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes: A Technical Analysis. The report analyzed
the seven issues from their 1980 report Managing Low-Level
Radioactive Wastes--A Proposed Approach. The report presented
alternative solutions to each of several major problems; and
each alternative was accompanied by a description of the
anticipated effects of the scenario. The analysis considered
Effects on Generators and Consumers, Effects on Transportation
and Disposal Sites, Direct Effects on Government, and Effects
on Occupational Exposure and Public Safety. The conclusions
of the analysis generally supported the recommendations made
in the Program's 1980 Proposed Approach. The 1980 recommenda-
35
tion to divide control between the federal and state
governments was excluded to accommodate the political reality
of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980.
In the autumn of 1981, the NRC proposed amendments to 10
CFR 61 to provide for the separation of low-level wastes into
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three categories. Despite the common misinterpretation that
the classification system includes a recognition of chemical
stability, the three-way system considers only radioactivity.
Any chemical or physical instability is assumed neutralized
before consideration in the classification system. These
amendments represented the first attempt to standardize the
classification system for low-level radioactive waste.
Barnwell, S.C., had previously barred medical and bio-research
wastes (because of their chemical hazard and the interaction
between organic solvents and radioactive materials previously
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described ), and Hanford, Washington had unsuccessfully
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attempted to exclude wastes from sources in other states.
However, no unified system for low-level radioactive waste
classification existed; and no provisions were made for
special treatment of particular wastes. The new proposal was
an effort to move toward the type of system proposed (but not
most highly recommended) in the 1980 Proposed Approach.
The NRC defined Class A segregated waste as wastes with
very low activities. These wastes need not meet stability
requirements that will ensure container integrity. Class B
stable waste is more radioactive and requires a structurally
stable waste form. Class C intruder waste is the most active
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species that can still be considered low-level. In addition
to stability requirements, Class C waste would require that
deeper burial or additional barriers be employed for any
trench that includes certain isotopes which, more than 100
years after closure of the site, could cause an exposure of
more than 500 milirems. Finally, any mixture of wastes would
be disposed of as if it were all of the highest category in
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the mixture.
A. Goldsmith criticizes this system as inadequate, al-
though she admits that it does acknowledge that low-level
waste is not homogeneous. Not only are the categories broad,
she believes, but insufficient instructions are given for the
88
proper treatment of the different types of waste.
Despite these objections, the three-way classification
system has been written into the Licensing Requirements for
Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Moreover, shallow land
disposal--the technology considered in this document--is the
only certified disposal technology.
The Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 freed the federal
government from responsibility for low-level radioactive
waste. However, because the federal government maintained
regulatory control, the States have been forced to depend on
the NRC and DOE to provide the guidelines and technical assis-
tance for their disposal and management programs. This assis-
tance has been slow and inadequate; and the States face a 1986
deadline without the resources to formulate relevant disposal
policies.
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CHAPTER 4
The Massachusetts response to the L.L.W.P. Act of 1980:
The passage of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980
placed Massachusetts in a awkward position. Although a major
generator of low-level radioactive waste, no disposal site
existed nearby. For Massachusetts to contine to dispose of
its waste after January 1, 1986, a new facility had to be
built--either within the Commonwealth or in a nearby state
with which a compact could be established. Unlike Southern or
Western states, Massachusetts could not simply make an agree-
ment with a state that housed an existing facility and still
remain within the principle of regional disposal expoused by
both the Low-Level Waste Policy Act and the State Planning
Council on Radioactive Waste Management.
Moreover, state environmental officials and resources
were already committed to the development of a coherent chemi-
cal hazardous waste management system and the time-consuming
task of writing and testing Chapter 21D, a new hazardous waste
facility siting act.
In the Spring of 1981, industrial generators submitted
House 6877 as an emergency bill to the Massachusetts legisla-
ture. Intended to provide a siting mechanism for low-level
radioactive waste disposal facilities, the bill was based on
the recently passed Chapter 21D; and large pieces of the
hazardous waste legislation had been copied wholesale.
Despite its similarities to the politically successful Chapter
21D, House Bill 6877 lacked the political support that its
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model gained through a lengthy process of public participation
and input. Most important, many felt that, despite the
urgency of the low-level radioactive waste problem, the issue
was too important to be dealt with exclusively on a crisis
level. In a memo submitted to the Massachusetts Oversight
Committee on Low Level Waste, Committee Member Michael S.
Baram wrote:
"The bill is not an emergency measure and should not be
enacted as~and "emergency law" as provided in the
preamble. There is no evidence to support this designa-
tion, and it appears to be no more than an effort to sell
the bill on the basis of alleged urgency and to unjusti-
fiably secure expedited treatment of the bill and legis-
lative acceptance of its several questionable features.
Further.. .emergencies are usually a basis for dispensing
with public notice and opportunity to contest matters,
etc...."89
House 6877 was withdrawn, and Chapter 738 was substituted,
setting up the Special Legislative Commission on Low-Level
Waste. The Commission, formed at the end of 1981, had a one
year authorization and included representatives of industry,
government, and the public. The Commission is currently
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awaiting re-authorization for a second year.
In August, 1981, the Coalition of Northeastern Governors
(CONEG) resolved to pursue the formation of a regional compact
to solve the problem of disposal of low-level waste generated
in their states. The Coalition, representing 11 states (Con-
necticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusets, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Vermont), includes six of the top twenty low-level waste
generating states. During the period 1979 to 1981, Coalition
39
member states generated one third of the total national
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volume.
Although they began work as a single group, the negotia-
tions called for the development of "a compact agree-
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ment(s)" , acknowledging that the Coalition members might
decide to form more than one compact. More important, this
provision meant that the formation of a compact was not con-
tingent on the participation of all Coalition members.
From its inception, the Coalition's goals were not
limited to the construction of a disposal site for the region.
In a Draft Work Plan dated November 5, 1981, the Coalition
included a large number of management goals, including
encouragement of "the reduction of the amounts of waste
generated in the region" and ensuring "the ecological manage-
ment of commercial low level radioactive waste generated in
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the region." While it is impossible to completely isolate
management and disposal issues, the rhetoric of the Coalition
clearly encompassed more than just the speedy siting of a
regional disposal facility. In addition to the basic desire
to integrate disposal into radioactive substance management,
there was a recognition of the political superiority of a
94
"management system" over a simple "disposal program". It is
interesting that the term "disposal site" does not appear
anywhere in the text of the Draft Work Plan. The term
"management site" is used throughout the document.
The next year saw a series of studies and public informa-
tion/participation programs. In October, 1981, the
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Massachusetts Department of Public Health, Radiation Control
Program, obtained U.S. Department of Energy funding to develop
a low-level radioactive waste management plan for the state.
The grant included provisions for a public information program
and a "consensual" process through which Massachusetts
interest groups and stakeholders could participate in the
planning process. The Department of Public Health and the
Center for Negotiation and Public Policy, Inc. worked with a
group that included various waste generating industries,
environmental and public interest groups, medical and academic
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institutions, and affected State agencies.
In October, 1982, Inter/Face Associates, Inc, working
under a subcontract from EG&G Idaho, Inc, completed the final
report on the Massachusetts Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Survey. With a response rate of almost 100 per
cent, the survey provided the first comprehensive information
available on Massachusetts' low-level waste generators.
In November, 1982, state radioactive waste management
planning was jarred by the passage of the Nuclear Initiative
Referendum, Question Number Three. Both regulatory officials
and the League of Women Voters opposed Question Three; and a
well-organized publicity campaign against the referendum
included editorials in Boston and New York newspapers.
Despite these efforts, Question Three was passed by a 2 to 1
margin. The referendum requires both voter approval and
General Court certification of certain findings as precondi-
tions for (1) the construction and operation of any new
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nuclear power plant facility and/or low-level radioactive
waste disposal or storage facility and (2) participation in a
regional low-level waste compact. The referendum includes an
exemption for a disposal facility for waste generated "through
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medical applications and bio-research."
According to Amy Goldsmith of the Massachusetts Nuclear
Referendum Campaign/Committee, the organization that sponsored
the referendum, Question Three was initiated after a non-
binding referendum failed to evoke legislative action and a
voter poll indicated public concern with the low-level
radioactive waste issue. Goldsmith believes that the passage
of Question Three reflects public dissatisfaction with the
history of low-level radioactive waste management in the U.S.
With its requirement of a state-wide referendum, Question
Three guarantees public involvement in the radioactive waste
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issue.
While this is one valid interpretation, the radioactive
waste component of the referendum may have passed only because
it was linked to the issue of nuclear power plant siting.
Question Three dealt with both nuclear power plants and low-
level radioactive waste disposal sites. Reactor siting is a
volatile and highly political issue; and although some voters
may have based their decision on the low-level radioactive
waste issue, many probably cast their "Yes" vote primarily as
a blow against nuclear power. Because the two issues were
combined in a single referendum, it is difficult to pinpoint
public sentiment toward either alone.
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According to Rich Smith of the Energy Committee, the
passage of Question Number Three in Massachusetts damaged the
Commonwealth's position in then ongoing CONEG negotiations and
currently threatens ratification of the compact by the state
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legislature. The negotiation relationship was based on
mutual trust and the understanding that each state had the
same chance of eventually housing a disposal site (a sentiment
that at least superficially resembles the rules of Russian
roulette). The November referendum and the roadblocks that it
placed before siting a facility in Massachusetts changed that
equal footing. Moreover, now that the CONEG compact has been
sent to the states for legislative approval, it is
questionable whether Massachusetts can enter the compact,
given the requirement that a state-wide referendum be passed
before joining.
If Massachusetts' participation in the compact is
unconstitutional, the state must either find a compact willing
to accept its waste, or site its own facility. The latter is
a more likely outcome. In the event that Massachusetts sites
its own facility without a regional compact, it is possible
that it will not be permitted to exclude wastes generated in
other states--the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980
guarantees exemption from Price-Anderson interstate commerce
rulings only if a compact with a minimum of three states is
established.
In December of 1982, CONEG completed its Draft
Preliminary Report Regional Facilities for Low-Level
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Radioactive Waste: An Overview. The report assessed the
various technologies available for low-level radioactive waste
treatment and disposal. The study examined the economic costs
associated with volume reduction, interm storage techniques,
and shallow land burial. It should be noted that volume
reduction is not a disposal technology--the same amount of
radioactivity is present after compaction or incineration, and
isolation of the reduced volume is still necessary.
The study concluded that, while volume reduction techno-
logies increased the risk of contamination to the environment
and increased personnel exposure, the techniques could sub-
stantially reduce the demand for disposal space within the
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region.
More important, the study concluded that the large fixed
costs associated with shallow land burial disposal sites meant
significant economies of scale. According to the study, "a
single regional site designed to serve all or a majority of
the region offers the most cost effective disposal option for
per unit costs...Once the capacity of the facility drops below
50% of the regional waste volume, cubic foot costs increase
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fairly steeply...." Given that the rules of compact
membership can be compared with the rules of Russian roulette,
the CONEG report confirmed that the gun only had to be fired
once.
In February 1983, the Massachusetts Department of Public
Health completed its Proposed Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Management Plan for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The
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report included both a series of general policy recommenda-
tions and a list of "next steps" for managing the Massachu-
setts waste problem. Report recommendations include proposals
to study both the health impacts of volume reduction techno-
logies and the short-term options available to meet the anti-
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cipated 1986 crisis. The DPH also recommended that it
remain the principal state regulatory agency for radioactive
materials, while the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
should have primary responsibility for development of a siting
103
process. The DPH suggested the institution of a program to
reduce generation volumes and recommended that the state seek
104
Agreement State status. Finally, the DPH suggested the
design and implementation of a comprehensive monitoring
105
program throughout the management system.
According to the Goldsmith, the DPH plan amounts to: (1)
interim storage and (2) retro-fitting of incinerators to burn
radioactive materials, reducing waste volumes--the industry
proposal for years. She notes that more precise waste classi-
fication and separation, important concerns of the Massachu-
setts Nuclear Referendum Committee, are given only passing
consideration in the DPH report. Although the DPH claimed a
"consensual process", Goldsmith maintains that the interests
of the environmental groups represented (The Sierra Club and
the Massachusetts Nuclear Referendum Committee--incorrectly
called the "Nuclear Petition Referendum" in the DPH draft) are
not apparent in the draft plan released by the Department.
Because the plan is still only a "draft", MNRC cannot "make a
45
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big stink" about the process.
In February, 1983, the Coalition of Northeastern
Governors approved a Northeast Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Management Compact. The eleven governors in
the coalition will submit the Compact to their respective
state's legislatures. If approved by all of the states (Note
that any amendments will have to be worked out between the
states involved), the Compact will go on for approval by the
U.S. Congress. It is generally assumed that the federal
government will rubber stamp any Compact that complies with
the spirit of the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980.
The Compact language calls for the creation of the
Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commis-
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sion. This Commission would consist of one representative
from each member state, appointed by the state Governor
108
according to procedures peculiar to that state. Any state
that hosts a disposal facility will have two members on the
109
Commission while it houses an operating facility. General
110
Commission decisions will be based on majority vote. In
the event that an insufficient number of facilities are
available and no member state volunteers to house a regional
waste facility, the Commission, by two-thirds vote, may desig-
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nate any party state to serve as a host state. Before
entering the Compact, each state must repeal any legislation
that conflicts with the Compact; and each state is required to
show that it is able to site a facility if selected as a host
112
state.
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In March, the Northeast Radwaste Network was formed
through the Massachusetts Nuclear Referendum Committee.
Coordinated through A. Goldsmith of MNRC, the Network
113
developed a list of objections to the Compact. The Network
believes that insufficient emphasis has been placed on
environmental concerns. They maintain that shallow land
burial--the only certified technology--may be singularly un-
suited to the compact region with its heavy rainfall and high
water table. They argue that even gross macroscreening of the
geology and hydrology has not been done and that it is pos-
sible that there is no environmentally sound site within the
compact region. Rich Smith of the Special Commission
generally concurs, pointing out that shallow land burial has
113a
had a 50 per cent failure rate.
The Network also believes that there are inadequate
provisions for review, public participation, and state
sovereignty. They argue that stricter fees and liability
assurances are essential, especially in light of past problems
in establishing financial responsibility for leakage from
radioactive waste disposal sites. The Network believes that
any radioactive waste management system should emphasize
source reduction; and they wish to limit the powers of the
Northeast Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission
with a system of checks and balances.
Finally, the Network objects to the use of economic and
political considerations in site selection. They believe that
only environmental and safety issues should be part of the
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siting process.
Many of the Network's criticisms are legitimate and
valuable--although they fail to recognize that the nature of
any interstate compact requires a substantial loss of
individual state sovereignty. The Network's desire to limit
Commission powers is valid, especially given that state
representatives to the Commission will be appointed by the
governors of member states--not elected. In addition, the
experiences of West Valley clearly illustrate the potentially
enormous problem of establishing financial responsibility for
radioactive leakage.
Their final objection, however, is simply obstructionist.
The Network may intend it only as a symbolic statement of a
commitment to environmental safety; however, any analysis
that exclusively considers environmental criteria ignores the
potential benefits of radioactive materials use. Moreover,
their stated philosophy obscures the fact that their
"technical goal" of no leakage is rooted in an implicit value
judgment and a particular political and economic framework.
Moreover, strictly observed, the Network's stated philosophy
would require the termination of all radioactive substance
use--followed by costly isolation of already contaminated
material.
Meanwhile, there have been two attempts to alter Question
Three, now Chapter 503. House 2768, currently under consi-
deration, has proposed an amendment to Question Three in the
exemption section, changing the wording to say "in connection
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with medical and bio-organic research" instead of "through
114
medical applications and bio-research." This change could
conceivably broaden the medical exemption section to include
the production of medical isotopes. New England Nuclear, a
major manufacturer of medical isotopes, produces over 90 per
cent of the curie content of Massachusetts low-level radioac-
115
tive waste.
As of this writing, the Compact has been approved by the
state of Maryland; and Governor Dukakis is planning to submit
the Compact to the Massachusetts legislature sometime within
the next few weeks.
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CHAPTER 5
The regulatory options available to a state are shaped by
the volume and character of the waste generated within its
borders. States with minimal waste production, for example,
may be able to ignore the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980.
Understanding its generators can help Massachusetts regulators
make informed decisions on the future of low-level radioactive
waste in the Commonwealth.
Waste Generation in Massachusetts: 1980 and Beyond
Three hundred and ninety facilities in Massachusetts are
currently licensed to use radioactive materials that may
result in low-level radioactive waste generation (189
industrial, 123 medical, 51 academic, 25 governmental, and 2
116
nuclear reactors) ; of these potential generators, about
ninety facilities actually ship waste to licensed low-level
radioactive waste disposal sites. The remainder produce no
waste (about half of all generators) or use alternative
methods--such as decay to background--to dispose of their
117
waste.
The approximately 300,000 cubic feet of waste produced by
Massachusetts makes it one of the top ten generators in the
118
country. This is particularly remarkable given that
Massachusetts has only two nuclear reactors--one with a very
small capacity. In a November 1980 report, the Massachusetts
Advisory Council on Radiation Protection estimated that the
Commonwealth produces between 40 and 50 per cent of the total
119
New England volume. Based on figures from EG&G Idaho,
50
Inc., Massachusetts generated 36 per cent of the New England
total (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and 20 per cent of the 11
state CONEG regional total in 1981. Within the CONEG region,
Massachusetts is the third largest generator after Pennsylva-
120
nia and New York, respectively.
Although the rate of waste increase will vary between
states, CONEG predicts that Massachusetts will remain the
third largest generator within the region through the year
121
2000. CONEG calculations include reactor waste from the 22
existing reactors and the 11 reactors currently under con-
struction, but do not include any decommissioning waste (Low-
level waste generated when a nuclear power plant closes down;
decommissioning waste includes contaminated machinery and
cleaning solutions.). Given these assumptions, CONEG predicts
that Massachusetts' annual waste generation will increase by
122
over 75 per cent between 1981 and 2000.
This waste volume could be reduced by thirty per cent
through compaction or between 60 to 75 per cent through the
adoption of incineration techniques. Both volume reduction
123
methods carry some risk of radiation release.
The waste generated within the Commonwealth has two
characteristics that are critical to policy development: (1)
there is a wide range of radioactive intensity in generated
waste with distinct generator/waste subcategories, and (2)
Waste generation sites are not evenly distributed throughout
the state and are concentrated in regions unsuitable for a
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waste disposal facility.
Despite the regulatory population of approximately 400,
the bulk of radioactivity in Massachusetts waste--97.3 per
cent of the curie content in 1981--is generated by radiophar-
124
maceutical production. Moreover these generators produced
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only 6.4 per cent of the 1981 waste volume. Led by New
England Nuclear, a world distributor of radiopharmaceuticals,
there are only 11 licensees for radiopharmaceutical production
in the state.
While the waste generated by radiopharmaceutical use is
relatively harmless, the materials used in and generated as
byproducts of production of these radionuclides are very dan-
gerous. In his 1981 book Radwaste, Fred Shapiro worte:
"Not all the medical wastes that still find their way
to the low-level commerical repositories are radioactive-
ly as innocuous as scintillation-counting liquids and
animal carcasses, however. At Barnwell, Ott told me that
"some of the hottest stuff we get" comes from the produc-
tion of radioisotopes and the fabrication of medical
radiation sources, primarily cobalt 60."126
The two nuclear reactors in the Commonwealth produced 2
per cent of the curie content and 18 per cent of the volume of
127
Massachusetts waste shipped in 1981. Finally, medical and
academic generators produced approximately 7 per cent of the
volume and less than 0.2 per cent of the curie content of
128
Massachusetts waste in that year. Although this population
generates only a small amount of radioactivity, the number of
129
licensees is large--approximately 170. Industrial uses
other than radiopharmaceutical production accounted for almost
75 per cent of the volume and less than 0.7 per cent of the
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curie content of waste shipped in 1981.
The population of Massachusetts regulatees is fairly
small. Moreover, it includes a very small number of
generators who produce large amounts of radioactivity in small
volumes; the remainder of generators produce comparatively
large volumes of much less intensely radioactive waste.
In addition to this distinct segmentation of the regula-
tory population and the waste they generate, it is important
to note that the majority of waste generators are in the
eastern part of the state and areas of high population. Given
that low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities must be
131
sited in rural areas, it is likely that any facility built
in Massachusetts would be in the western part of the Common-
wealth.
In this context, it is clear that waste mangement
policies can be targeted toward particular segments of the
regulatory population. This option gives regulators substan-
tial flexibility in designing regulatory frameworks and
emergency procedures. In the event of another crisis, for
example, source reduction might be imposed on industrial
generators only. Since they generate so litte radioactivity,
medical licensees might be allowed to continue normal nuclear
services.
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CHAPTER 6
The Current Regulatory Framework:
The current regulatory framework for low-level radioac-
tive waste in Massachusetts includes the NRC, the Department
of Transportation, the Department of Energy, and the EPA.
Other actors include State Police required to spot transport
violations.
The Department of Energy has the lead role for developing
a program of technical assistance to states. In addition, the
DOE is responsible for promoting peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. This role was inherited from the Atomic Energy Com-
mission in 1974 when AEC regulatory authority was transferred.
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to the NRC and the AEC was disbanded.
The DOE provides studies on waste generation, waste
treatment technologies, and disposal needs. Much of this work
is done through contracts with EG&G of Idaho. Within the
Northeast, studies of waste generation were subcontracted
through Inter/Face Associates, Inc. of Middletown, Connecti-
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cut.
The NRC was granted regulatory authority under the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-438). The Commission has
developed a comprehensive set of rules controlling waste
management and disposal; and it is also responsible for
licensing and monitoring organizations that handle controlled
material. In the event of rule violations, the NRC can
restrict or revoke a license. This licensing role can be
transferred to a state agency through the Agreement State
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Program initiated in 1959. Twenty-six states are currently
134
enrolled in the Agreement State Program.
The Department of Transportation regulates the transport
of hazardous materials, including radioactive waste. The DOT
has developed regulations that prescribe packaging of waste
135
and the routing of waste carriers.
The EPA is responsible for establishing environmental
criteria, including radiation protection standards geared
toward the protection of populations and the environment. The
EPA has promulgated standards for both maximum permissible
dosages to populations and limits on radioactive emissions.
The Agency is currently developing environmental standards for
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low-level radioactive waste disposal.
In regulations released in December, 1982, the NRC esta-
blished the basis of a new low-level radioactive waste manage-
ment system. In addition to the three-way classification
described in Chapter Three, this system includes a program
that uses manifests to track the movement of radioactive
137
waste. The manifest system considers three groups: genera-
tors; shippers and/or processors; and disposal facility opera-
tors. Rules are provided for both waste transporters who ship
only prepackaged waste and waste processors who treat or
reprocess waste before shipment.
According to the new 10 CFR 20.311, each shipment of
radioactive waste to a licensed land disposal facility must be
accompanied by a shipment manifest identifying the generator
55
and tranporter. The manifest must also indicate "as
completely as possible" the composition of the waste shipment,
including both radionuclide content and chemical composition.
Wastes must be identified as Class A, B, or C.
The manifest must be certified by an authorized represen-
tative of the waste generator; and the generator is required
to conduct a quality control program to ensure compliance with
regulations.
Upon shipment, one copy of the manifest must be forwarded
to the intended recipient; alternatively, a collector may
acknowledge receipt of the waste upon transfer. One copy of
the manifest must always accompany the shipment. The genera-
tor is required to retain both a copy of the manifest and
documentation of acknowledgement. If the generator does not
receive acknowledgement of receipt from the intended recipient
within one week, the generator must initiate an investigation.
Upon shipment to a disposal facility, a shipper of pre-
packaged waste must prepare a new manifest reflecting the
consolidation of wastes from different sources. Generator
manifests must be appended. The original generator manifests
may be ommitted if the new manifest includes all of the re-
quired information for each package. The collector licensee
must certify that nothing has been done to invalidate the
generators' certification. One copy of this manifest must
accompany the waste, and another must be forwarded to the
shallow land disposal facility operator.
A waste processor is required to prepare a new manifest
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to accompany the waste; and the processor beomes responsible
for the waste and the validity of the manifest.
If the disposal facility operator does not receive the
waste within sixty days of the advance manifest, the operator
must notify the generator, the collector, and the Director of
the nearest NRC regional office.
If the land disposal facility operator does not acknow-
ledge receipt to the shipper within 20 days of transfer, the
shipper must initiate an investigation into the matter.
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CHAPTER 7
Assessing the Regulatory System: Criticism and Suggestions
It is important to note that the new manifest system
involves the NRC only in the event of a lost shipment; wastes
are not routinely tracked by any governmental agency. In
addition, while the manifests must be certified, middlemen
could conceivably falsify documents, ultimately disposing of
less waste than they receive from generators.
The manifest system also relies heavily on the good will
of waste generators. It is difficult, if not impossible, to
account for the amount of radioactivity handled by a licensee.
Many facilities can generate radioactivity on site (including
reactors and cyclotrons); and in this context, waste genera-
tion does not necessarily correspond to the amount of radioac-
tivity actually transported to the site. Labs and hospitals
that receive licensed material can always claim that any
unaccounted for radiation "has decayed" or "is in the animal".
The tracking system seems particularly inappropriate in labs
where a certain amount of material can be released into sani-
tary sewers or the hazardous waste stream. In this setting,
filling out manifests becomes a meaningless exercise.
The system does, however, force generators to think about
the waste they produce; and the consciences of generators--
combined with personnel exposure guidelines and the recogni-
tion that a negative public perception of radiation could
threaten all use--have been fairly reliable in controlling
contamination of the environment from generation sites.
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Despite its deficiencies, the radioactive waste manage-
ment system has been more successful than most other environ-
mental regulation programs. While they expressed little con-
cern with radioactive waste management, the AEC carefully
regulated nuclear materials in the interests of national
security. Only licensed individuals and groups can purchase
and use radioactive materials; and careful records are kept to
ensure that unauthorized persons do not acquire them. The
relatively high education level of radiation personnel has
helped maintain this system of checks. Finally, public fear
of radiation has prevented the widespread use and abuse of
radionuclides.
Radioactive emissions have been produced by accidents and
the failure of (arguably inadequate) safety measures; but
intentionally illegal waste disposal has not been a major
problem--unlike the case of hazardous chemical waste. It
should be noted that the growing commercialization of biologi-
cal research and the demand for radiopharmaceuticals may
change that situation. Moreover, the rapidly increasing cost
of legal disposal (from $28 to about $200/30 gallon drum in
138
recent years ) may provide an additional incentive for
illegal disposal in the future.
The primary problems in low-level waste disposal, then,
revolve around (1) disposal sites and the need to coordinate
generation with appropriate disposal technologies and (2) the
safe packaging and transport of radioactive wastes. Contro-
versy in low-level waste disposal has centered on the failures
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of legal disposal and the inadequacies of isolation techno-
logy.
Safe Packaging and Transport:
The regional distribution of disposal sites will resolve
much of the controversy around this issue--if only because
radioactive waste will travel fewer highway miles. Other
programs have been developed to encourage safe packaging and
transport of radioactive waste.
The new manifest program may improve past sloppiness in
low-level radioactive waste packaging. By forcing the genera-
tor to certify safe packaging, responsibility has been placed
on a single party--a party that has a great deal to lose if
its disposal privileges are suspended. The effectiveness of
this system, however, depends entirely on the strictness of
enforcement by regulators.
Moreover, the manifest system does not directly address
the transport safety issue. Despite the requirement that
generators certify that their waste packaging complies with
regulations, waste shipments are not inspected until they
arrive at the disposal site. In his book Radwaste, Fred C.
Shapiro noted that two of the major waste shippers to the
Barnwell, South Carolina disposal facility (Tri-State Motor
Transit and Home Transportation Co. Chem Nuclear) maintained
terminals near the disposal site. Shapiro wrote: "The trailer
is checked by workers of the trucking firm there, at the end
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of its journey." Only after careful scrutiny and the
correction of problems was waste moved the last few yards to
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the Barnwell gate where regulatory officials check the ship-
ment. While this subversion of the inspection system
developed in a period when the shippers--not the generators--
had primary responsibility for waste packaging, the manifest
system does not protect against the continuation of this
practice.
It seems likely that this new manifest program was
adapted from the EPA's "cradle to grave" tracking system for
hazardous chemical waste. Despite superficial similarities
between the disposal processes (including the tri-partite
division between generators-shippers/processors-disposal site
operators), the sizes of the two regulatory populations are
very different. In addition, the hazardous and radioactive
waste systems have radically different sets of existing
incentives. In their enthusiasm to follow the EPA's lead, the
NRC failed to recognize that the primary issue the manifest
system attempts to address--illegal disposal--is currently not
a major problem in nuclear waste management.
Viewed in this light, the manifest system appears to be
an unproductive additional expense to generators. Regulatory
resources might have been better spent to enforce existing
rules on packaging requirements, using spot checks of waste in
transit to confirm that NRC and DOT rules have been observed.
The relatively small number of shipments makes direct
regulation possible; and the release of shipment routes will
not endanger national security. Moreover, clear marking of
radioactive waste packages is required by both the manifest
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system and existing regulations, making identification of
waste easy for inspectors. Finally, the integrity of waste
containers can be easily checked with a geiger counter.
Isolation Technologies:
Solutions to the technical problems of waste isolation
lie in improved disposal techniques and reduction of the
amount of waste requiring disposal. Because of the wide range
of materials classified as "low-level waste", the most obvious
solution is to apply the appropriate disposal technology to
each type of waste.
Given the segmentation of the regulatory population and
the wastes they generate, the three-way classification system
recently developed by the NRC seems adequate to deal with the
radionuclide hazard of low-level waste. However, more ela-
borate classification is needed to address issues of chemical
hazard and the interaction of chemical and radioactive
materials in the waste.
The need for developing classification systems based on
"total waste hazard" has been recognized for years. In 1980
and 1981, EG&G Idaho, Inc. explicitly recommended such a
program; their Technical Analysis included an economic
analysis considering effects of a "total hazard" classifica-
tion system. According to EG&G,
"Classification by total hazard would result in
substantial increases in waste handling and recordkeeping
requirements for generators. No changes in transporta-
tion operations would be required. The volume of waste
shipped to disposal sites would decrease, while the final
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curie inventory at such sites would increase. No new
technologies would be required for this system of waste
classification, though many generators would have to use
technology directed toward managing the toxic components
of their waste. Because the total-hazard classification
system is deemed desirable buy the states, development of
interstate compacts and new regional disposal sites would
be enhanced. The costs of waste management and disposal
to generators and consumers would increase substantially
in comparison with current practice. The occupational
exposure of personnel employed by generators would in-
crease, whereas population risks would decrease... .141
EG&G supported this type of system because it "provides the
best assessment of the environmental protection that is
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needed."
Defending their decision to use a system recognizing only
radioactive hazard, the NRC claimed that chemical hazard makes
142a
up only a little of the waste they handle . More to the
point, the NRC wrote:
"The Commission has stated publicly on several
occasions that if it were technically feasible to
classify waste by total hazard, then it would make
eminently good sense to do so. We do not now know of any
scheme for such classification..."143
This is a valid claim, but the development of such a "total
hazard system" must be a priority of the NRC.
In addition to this technical change, we need to inte-
grate chemical and radioactive waste issues. The differences
between the two regulatory populations--size, character of
generators, and the existing regulatory complex--make separate
regulation advantageous. However, there has been considerable
and dysfunctional conflict between the radioactive and chemi-
cal hazard systems in recent years.
The NRC de-classification of scintillation fluid, for
example, dumped new material on the chemical hazardous waste
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system; and interaction effects between the chemical and
radioactive components of the waste could pose problems for
hazardous waste regulators. The decision to de-classify cer-
tain concentrations of tritium and Carbon-14 was made without
extensive investigation of the effects of de-regulation on the
chemical hazardous waste system.
In the public arena, radioactive and chemical waste
spokesmen often undermine one another's positions. Within the
radioactive waste literature, constant references are made to
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the 'greater hazard posed by chemical wastes.' A.
Goldsmith of the Mass. Nuclear Referendum Committee commented
that in Minnesota the hazardous waste facility siting process
was aided by constant reminders that 'this is not radioactive
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waste.' Regulators must discard the idea that the way to
reduce public fears is to compare hazards to other existing
dangers.
Coordination of the two regulatory systems also could
ease disposal facility siting. In addition to fiscal induce-
ments, for example, communities willing to host a radioactive
waste disposal facility might be exempted from consideration
when it comes time to site a hazardous waste facility. Unless
the two systems are linked, this kind of bargaining is
impossible.
Massachusetts also needs to integrate low-level radioac-
tive waste production and disposal. In this context, the
Commonwealth would benefit from Agreement State status. Regu-
latory authority would permit Massachusetts to more
64
effectively encourage source reduction, potentially limiting
waste generation.
Moreover, without Agreement State status, the relation-
ship between waste generation and disposal could potentially
become adversarial--with the federal government encouraging
nuclear uses while the state struggles to deal with the
resulting waste volumes. The Supreme Court recently decided
that a state can block reactor construction until adequate
disposal facilities are available for high-level waste.
Despite this significant victory for States' rights in nuclear
waste management, Agreement State status would still be useful
for Massachusetts--especially given the huge volume of waste
it generates.
In the recent draft of the Massachusetts DPH plan, the
Task Force noted that Agreement State status would facilitate
enforcement of regulations, create a body of people know-
ledgeable in radiation matters within the Commonwealth, and
make regulation of licenses more responsive to generator
146
needs.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion:
The history of radioactive waste disposal has been
characterized by continual attempts to shunt the problem out
of sight--to find economical, short-term solutions to assauge
growing public concern with the radwaste issue. The AEC,
suffering from the contradictions of an agency charged with
both promoting and regulating radioactive materials, ignored
the problem. The NRC, created in the mid-1970's, dealt with
the issue on a crisis level and was unable to develop a
coherent and powerful policy.
In the book Radioactive Waste, Ronnie Lipshutz recom-
mended the establishment of a central agency, dedicated exclu-
sively to the regulation of radioactive waste. According to
Lipshutz, past failures were partially the result of institu-
tional inadequacies. The AEC's conflicting mandates permitted
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poor waste management ; and Lipshutz saw the same problem in
the current DOE and NRC.
The events of recent years suggest a genuine governmental
concern for the low-level radioactive waste issue. However,
it is possible that the NRC's decision to transfer disposal
responsibility to the states--in the face of a 1986 deadline--
is another example of the past pattern of defferal and irre-
sponsibility. While it may not silence general public criti-
cisms, the Low-Level Waste Policy Act of 1980 quelled the
three most vocal opponents of the NRC--South Carolina, Nevada,
and Washington state--and officially absolved the NRC of
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responsibility.
Some skeptics view the L.L.W.P. Act of 1980 as a gauntlet
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thrown in the face of states demanding empowerment. This
interpretation, however, implies that the NRC was unwilling to
give up control of low-level radioactive waste mangement. The
NRC's strategy to force the re-opening of disposal sites in
late 1979 shows that the Commission clearly had the power to
deal with any opponents. While the "Crisis of 1979" did re-
structure the debate around low-level waste, the NRC permit-
ted--even encouraged--this change.
The current problem in Massachusetts centers on the NRC's
1986 deadline. Even if Massachusetts began construction of a
shallow land disposal facility today, the site would not be
operational by the January 1, 1986 deadline; and even the most
rudimentary environmental, geological, and hydrological
feasibility studies have not been done. Individuals on both
sides of the controversy admit that shallow land burial--the
only certified disposal technology--may be unsuitable for
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Massachusetts. The technology has a 50 per cent practical
failure rate; and the technique has never succeeded in an area
with heavy rainfall and a high water table. Standards for
above-surface engineered facilities probably will not be ready
by 1986--and certainly not in time for implementation by the
Commonwealth before the 1986 deadline.
Although the deadline has spurred action--action that
might have been indefinitely deferred in state legislatures--
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the artificial crisis created by the NRC has produced a situa-
tion in which thoughtful and judicious action is unlikely.
Moreover, issues of local control and public participa-
tion have been trampled in the rush to meet the 1986 deadline.
What was obstensibly the most important issue of the 1979
"Crisis" has been shelved indefinitely. In this setting,
"environmentalist" has become synonymous with "obstruc-
tionist"; and Question Three, which requires a public referen-
dum before Massachusetts sites a facility or enters a compact,
is seen as a hinderance that should be avoided or circumvented
if possible.
Alternatives:
Massachusetts can follow either of two broad strategies:
(1) The Commonwealth could oppose the federal mandate to
develop regional disposal facilities for radioactive waste;
and (2) Massachusetts can comply with the Low-Level Radioac-
tive Waste Policy Act of 1980, attempting to site a facility.
Opposition can take one of two forms: an attempt to
change the 1986 deadline or otherwise modify the Act; or'
opposition of the basic principle of state responsibility for
low-level radioactive waste.
The fact that Massachusetts radiopharmaceutical produc-
tion--which generates the bulk of the Commonwealth's dangerous
waste--provides these drugs for the entire nation is a power-
ful argument for a national solution to the low-level waste
problem; and much as three states held the country for ransom
in 1979, Massachusetts could potentially back its demands with
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the threat that radiopharmaceutical production would be
discontinued until adequate disposal facilities are located.
In addition, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act
is based on the principle that each state should decide for
itself if it wants the benefits of nuclear technology.
However, many waste generating uses were implemented only
because of vigorous federal support. Even if these activities
were discontinued today, large amounts of waste would require
disposal. Nuclear power plants are a particularly dramatic
example of this problem; de-commissioning a nuclear reactor
will produce enormous quantities of waste. The contradiction
between the vigorous federal promotion of nuclear technology
and the exclusive state responsibility for waste could be used
to argue for repeal or alteration of the L.L.R.W.P.A. of 1980.
If Massachusetts decides to comply with the Low-Level
Waste Policy Act of 1980, several choices are available. The
Commonwealth can site a facility immediately, using the new
shallow-land burial regulations. This process would imply
either CONEG membership or "going-it-alone"--i.e. siting a
disposal facility within Massachusetts without cooperation
from other states.
There are advantages to each scenario; however, the shal-
low-land burial technology is both unreliable and effectively
irreversible--radioactive waste buried with this technology
cannot be easily retrieved if leakage is detected.
In this context, the risks of attempting immediate siting
are too great. Moreover, this option would require the
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circumvention of the public participation both central to the
democratic process and mandated by Question Three.
Alternatively, Massachusetts could decide to wait for the
new regulations for engineered disposal facilites (disposal in
structures). This would imply "going-it-alone", because the
Compact cannot wait for these new regulations to be issued.
Interim storage of all Commonwealth waste would be required
for the implementation of this alternative.
Recommendations:
The Commonwealth should not attempt to immediately site a
disposal facility, although macro-screening of hydrology and
geology should begin. Given the existing technological
options, the state is unequipped to site a safe facility. In
addition, Massachusetts should not join the CONEG compact.
While Compact membership could mean that no facility would be
built in the state, participation also requires both the
willingness and ability to expedite disposal facility
150a
siting.
Massachusetts should enter the Agreement State Program.
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The licensing procedure takes a minimum of two years ; and
if the Commonwealth applies now, it can have Agreement State
status by '1986. Agreement State status is useful for the
reasons outlined in Chapter 7; and although there will be some
start-up costs, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
calculates that most of the program operations can be funded
152
by user fees.
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Using NRC guidelines, the Department of Public Health
estimates that 5-8 technical staff would be needed to maintain
153
the existing Commonwealth nuclear licenses. The DPH sug-
gests that the existing Radiation Control Program be expanded
to include the new Agreement State responsiblities. Because
of staff overlap, the Department estimates that this strategy
would mean only 2-3 additional technical personnel would be
154
required.
In The Agreement State Program, Holmes Brown pointed out
the advantages for licensees of centralizing radiation
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programs in a single agency. Although the DPH currently
has a radiation control program, the Department has signifi-
cant credibility problems within the Commonwealth; and their
Draft Plan has alienated environmental groups. I recommend
that the Commonwealth place the new regulatory program within
the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering--the
agency that currently handles hazardous waste disposal and
facility siting. In addition to avoiding the public image
problems of the DPH, this strategy would permit coordination
of and trade-offs between the low-level radioactive and
hazardous chemical waste management systems.
The Commonwealth should also: (1) fight for revision of
the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980; (2)
encourage the speedy development of new regulations for
engineered structures; and (3) develop interim storage
capacity.
Massachusetts should resist the L.L.R.W.P.A. of 1980.
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The 1986 deadline is unreasonable; and the public will be the
big losers if this deadline is strictly observed. If Congress
refuses an extension, the federal government should be asked
to provide disposal space in DOE sites until adequate disposal
capacity for commercial waste is created in each state.
The 1980 Act was built on a shaky theoretical foundation;
and the basic rationale and assumptions of the Act can be
challenged. Moreover, other states will likely be willing to
participate in this "state revolt;" Many of the Midwestern
and Northeastern states are having similar problems with the
1986 deadline.
Given the history of low-level waste management, it is
possible that the states would do a better regulatory job than
the federal government. In this context, state regulation
would be desirable; but exclusive state responsiblity to
provide disposal--especially within the constraints of a
regional system--is too large a burden.
In addition, the Commonwealth should publicly pressure
the federal government to provide the technical assistance
promised and needed. Inadequate information is available on a
number of questions including: the effects of adding low-level
radioactive materials to the hazardous waste stream; and
requirements for designing and siting an above-surface
engineered disposal facility.
Finally, the Commonwealth should work toward developing
interim storage facilities. Several private licensees
currently maintain facilities for interim storage. Reactors
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have received a five year extension for on-site disposal and
storage; and laboratories and hospitals, remembering the
"Crisis of 1979," are beginning to exploit alternate disposal
technologies--decay to background, compaction, and incinera-
tion, for example--in anticipation of another emergency in
156
1986.
By encouraging these trends, the Commonwealth can reduce
the amount of interim storage that will be necessary in the
event of a disposal crisis. To accommodate this reduced
volume, Massachusetts should initiate procedures to site a
state interim disposal facility--remembering that interim
storage must not replace a permanent solution (High-level
waste has been in "interim storage" for decades.).
The DEQE could use incentives to facilitate the siting
process. For example, many localities might fear that wil-
lingness to host an interim storage facility will be inter-
preted as weakness--eventually leading to their selection as a
permanent disposal site. This could be prevented with a
promise that any locality that hosts an interim storage
facility will be exempted from consideration as a potential
site for a hazardous waste disposal facility. (Note that we
cannot promise to never site a permanent radioactive waste
disposal facility in that locality. Given the stringent geo-
logical and hydrological requirements for a disposal site,
there may be little freedom in selecting a location within the
Commonwealth.)
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Above all, the Commonwealth must avoid a crisis treatment
of this problem. Because of the longevity of radioactive
wastes, Massachusetts residents will have to live with the
implications of current decisions for many years. If we can
find a way to temporarily handle the waste generated in Massa-
chusetts, the Commonwealth can soften the 1986 deadline,
buying time to re-formulate the problem to permit a better
solution than the currently available no-win choices of com-
pact membership or "going-it-alone" with inadequate
technology.
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